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PHARMACOGENOMICS: TAILORING THE DRUG
APPROVAL PROCESS FOR DESIGNER DRUGS
Margaret Crews
INTRODUCTION
Pharmacogenomics is the practice of tailoring drugs to particular
genetic profiles, with the ambition of reducing instances of adverse reactions
and ensuring optimal treatment.'1 0 wing its existence in part to the success
of the Human Genome Project (HGP) the pharmacogenomic movement
grew as the relationship between genetics and a person's health became
increasingly relevant in understanding disease.3  The entry of
pharmacogenomics into drug therapy is greatly anticipated largely due to the
positive impact it will have on drug therapy and development, but
substantial hurdles exist.
4
. J.D. 2008. The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; B.A. 2003,
Kenyon College. The author would like to thank Professor Kelly for acting as an advisor
during the writing period, as well as the Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy
staff for their editorial support.
1. Janet Woodcock, FDA Policy on Pharmacogenomic Data in Drug Development,
66 LA. L. REV. 91, 92 (2005) ("Pharmacogenomics, is the science of correlating drug
responses to genetic data-meaning the generation of gene or gene expression data that
correlate genes and observed drug responses."); see also, Dep't of Energy, Office of Sci.,
Human Genome Program, Pharmacogenomics, http://www/ornl.gov/sci/techresources/
HumanGenome/medicine/pharma.shtml (last visited Mar. 22, 2008) [Hereinafter Human
Genome Program].
2. Human Genome Program, supra note I.
3. Id.
4. Id. (The anticipated goals of pharmacogenomics are listed by HGP as: more
powerful drugs; effective treatment immediately as opposed to "trial-and-error"
prescriptions; more accurate methods of determining appropriate drug dosages; advanced
screening for disease; better vaccines; better, cheaper drug trials as pharmacogenomics
companies will be able to discover potential therapies through drug trials for specific
genetic populations; and, thus, a decrease in overall health care costs. Barriers and
potential pitfalls of pharmacogenomics are described by the HGP as: time consuming in
that finding gene variations that affect drug response is not a quick process; certain gene
variations may preclude the use of certain drugs, thus reducing treatment options rather
than increasing treatment options; the preclusion of many gene variations may become a
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One of the challenges facing the development of pharmacogenomics
is that it must occur within the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA)
regulatory framework. This framework has necessarily evolved as drug
therapy has advanced.5 Regardless of changes in methodology, the twofold
mission of the FDA, to protect public health by assuring the safety, efficacy,
and security of drugs that enter the market and to ensure that advanced and
innovative new drugs reach the public in a timely manner, remains
6
steadfast. Despite reform, the FDA is consistently criticized by consumer
disincentive for drug companies to produce multiple pharmacogenomic products as the
financial incentive may be lowered; and, finally, pharmacogenomics requires doctors and
providers to develop and maintain a greater understanding of genetics than was
previously necessary); see also Teresa Kelton, Pharacogenomics: The Re-Discovery of
the Concept of Tailored Drug Therapy and Personalized Medicine, 19 HEALTH LAWYER
3 (2007).
5. See generally Howard Markel, Why America Needs a Strong FDA, 294 JAMA
2489, 2489 (2005); U.S. Food & Drug Admin., New Requirements for Prescribing
Information, www.fda.gov/cder/regulatory/physlabel/default.htm (last visited Jan. 29,
2007) (The FDA revised the prescription drug format in 2006 in an effort to improve the
accessibility of drug information).
6. The FDA introduced the "Critical Path Initiative" on March 16, 2004, an "effort
to stimulate and facilitate a national effort to modernize the sciences through which FDA-
regulated products are developed, evaluated and manufactured." U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., FDA's CRITICAL PATH INITIATIVE-SCIENCE ENHANCING THE HEALTH AND
WELL-BEING OF ALL AMERICANS (Jan. 2007), http://www.fda.gov/oc/initiatives/
criticalpath/initiative.html. Despite the FDA's concern that drug development was not
reaching its full potential, drug approval rates have peaked due to the Prescription Drug
User Fee Act. See Phil B. Fontanerosa et al., Postmarketing Surveillance-Lack of
Vigilance, Lack of Trust, 292 JAMA 2647, 2647 (2004) (stating that median drug
approval times had been reduced from 27 months in 1993 to 14 months in 2001); see also
Douglas J. Pisano, FDA REGULATORY AFFAIRS: A GUIDE FOR PRESCRIPTION DRUGS,
MEDICAL DEVICES, AND BIOLOGICS 12-13 (Douglas J. Pisano & David Mantus eds., CRC
Press) (2004) [hereinafter FDA REGULATORY AFFAIRS] ("[A]pproval rates have increased
from approximately 50% to nearly 80% and the review times have decreased to under 15
months for most applications."); but see Robert Oldham, Assoc. Dir., Singletary
Oncology Ctr., Remarks at the Manhattan Institute Conference Series: Medical Progress
and the FDA: Our Future in the Balance (June 3, 2002) available at
http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/mics8.htm [hereinafter Oldham] (reporting that
between 1990 and 2002 the number of drugs approved by the FDA had not changed
significantly and while the approval time grew shorter, the total drug development time
has increased by more than half because of new rules and paperwork required by the
FDA and that the total cost of development has also increased).
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advocates for being too closely connected with drug manufacturers and for
failing to adequately follow approved drugs once they have entered the
market. 7 Proponents of pharmaceutical development criticize the FDA as
stalling innovation and alienating free market principles. 8 The successful
entry of pharmacogenomics into the practice of medicine will require the
FDA to address many of its shortcomings without chilling advancements in
the modernizing and changing field of drug therapy. The ability of
pharmacogenomics to meet this challenge will require legislative action to
motivate pharmaceutical companies, the FDA, and medical professionals to
work together in creating a safe, effective, and modem drug market.
This comment addresses the FDA's struggle to realize the goals of its
mission statement, which include lofty ambitions for the prompt availability
of innovative, effective, and safe drugs. I0 The entry of pharmacogenomics
into mainstream medicine will create novel concerns that further tax the
FDA and hinder medical advancement if not anticipated through appropriate
legislation."I It is imperative to address the FDA's current shortfalls with
7. See Fontanerosa et al., supra note 6, at 2647.
The inadequacies of the postmarketing surveillance system . . . for
ensuring safety are well known and include: reliance on voluntary
reporting of adverse events by physicians and other health care
professionals; poor quality of submitted reports, often with
inadequate documentation and detail; underreporting of adverse
outcomes with capture of only a small fraction of adverse events that
actually occur; difficulty in calculating rates of adverse events,
together with unreliable denominator data on exposure; limited
ability for spontaneous reports to establish causal relationships; and
difficulty in determining whether the adverse event resulted from the
drug or the disease it was intended to treat.
Id; see also Sheila R. Shulman & Andrea Kuettel, Symposium on Health Care: Drug
Development and the Public Health Mission: Collaborative Challenges at the FDA, NIH,
and Academic Medical Centers, 53 BUFFALO L. REV. 663, 666 (2005).
8. See Richard Epstein, Regulatory Paternalism in the Market for Drugs: Lessons
from Vioxx and Celebrex, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 741, 748 (2005).
9. Woodcock, supra note 1, at 94.
10. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA's Mission Statement, http://www.fda.gov/
opacom/morechoices/mission.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2008).
11. See Woodcock, supra note 1, at 94.
From a public policy standpoint, the goal is to advance the science and to move it along
as quickly as possible in a responsible manner because it has such promise to advance
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legislation that anticipates pharmacogenomics. This comment first
addresses the current system at the FDA, then it focuses on
pharmacogenomics and their impact, reviews legislative responses to
previous concerns in drug development and the applicability of such
responses in anticipation of pharmacogenomics, and this comment finally
concludes with recommendations for legislative solutions. These
recommendations call for development incentives, continued improvement
in the area of post-market surveillance of drugs, and increased access to
information.
1. FDA: CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS
At present, the FDA is responsible for the approval of new drugs, as
well as the continued surveillance of drugs to identify new risks and hazards
after they have entered the market. 12 Accordingly, it is important to address
both the pre-approval period and the post-approval period when considering
current concerns as well as potential solutions. Consistent with its mission,
the FDA has established various programs and initiatives to help increase the
rate of drug development so that it maintains an even pace with scientific
advances and discoveries.' 3 To fulfill its role in advancing public health, the
FDA must delicately balance its interest in keeping unsafe drugs off the
market with its interest in encouraging innovation.
14
A. Drug Approval Process
Pursuant to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), prior
to approval for marketing in the United States, all new drugs are subjected to
therapeutics and to improve human health .... We need appropriate legal and regulatory
policies put in place to allow things to move forward responsibly. Moreover, we have to
integrate our existing-and this is what is often very challenging-regulatory and legal
framework with this new science. As a new science emerges, the laws and policies
crafted in an earlier time for an earlier type of information, data, or science often become
awkward entanglements.
Id.
12. See U.S. Food & Drug Admin., supra note 10.
13. See id
14. Markel, supra note 5, at 2491 ("Throughout its history, the FDA has had to
negotiate a hard line between its charge of protecting the American public based on
scientific evidence and the pressing needs or desires of business interests."); see
generally Epstein, supra note 8.
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a lengthy and expensive investigative process administered by the FDA.1
5
The Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) reviews the
applications for drup approval and monitors approved drugs that have
reached the market. The CDER largely finances its reviews through
prescription drug user fees (PDUFs), which pharmaceutical companies pay
to the FDA with the specific purpose of accelerating the drug approval
17process.
In practice, FDA approval starts with a preclinical investigation to
ensure that the potential drug can be safely tested on humans, after which an
investigational new drug application (INDA) must be submitted to the
FDA. If the FDA does not object to the application, a clinical study
protocol must be submitted and approved by an Institutional Review Board
(IRB).19 The clinical investigation of a new drug has several phases: Phase I
includes a small, brief study of human subjects; Phase II includes controlled
studies with human subjects who have the disease or condition being treated;
and Phase III includes larger studies that are meant to discover any
unanticipated adverse effects on individuals. In its final phase, a New
Drug Application (NDA) is submitted to the FDA.2 1 The NDA must include
an extensive collection of information consisting of all data collected during
the trials as well as labeling, manufacturing plans, and a risk-benefit analysis
15. FDA REGULATORY AFFAIRS, supra note 6, at 11-12; see also Joe DiMasi, Dir.,
the Tufts Ctr. for the Study of Drug Dev., Remarks at the Manhattan Institute Conference
Series: Medical Progress and the FDA: Our Future in the Balance (June 3, 2000)
[hereinafter DiMasi] (stating that the range for out of pocket research and development
costs for pharmaceutical companies was between $354 million and $558 million per drug
and the range for capitalized costs was between $650 million and $1 billion); Oldham,
supra note 6.
16. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., IMPROVING PUBLIC HEALTH, CENTER FOR DRUG
EVALUATION AND RESEARCH (2003), http://www.fda.gov/opacom/factsheets/justthefacts/
3cder.pdf.
17. U.S. Food and Drug Admin., Prescription Drug User Fees--Overview,
http://www.fda.gov/oc/pdufa/overview.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2008).
18. FDA REGULATORY AFFAIRS, supra note 6, at 8-9.
19. Id. at 9-10.
20. Id. at 10-11.
21. Id. at I1.
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of the new drug.22 In addition to showing that the drug is safe for use, the
NDA must also show that there is "substantial evidence" that the product
will have its intended effect. 23  "Substantial evidence" is defined as
"[a]dequate and well controlled investigations including clinical
investigations, by experts qualified by scientific training and experience to
evaluate the effectiveness of the drug involved, on the basis of which it
could fairly be concluded by such experts that the product will have the
effect it purports to have." 24 In 2004, due to questions about drug approval
standards, the FDA implemented an adjudicatory program in which
differences of professional opinion between the FDA and outside experts
could be reviewed, drug safety/risk management consultations with other
experts and agencies were authorized, and management guidelines for
pharmaceutical companies to aid in identifying and assessing safety risks
were published.25
The FDA must decide that a drug is "safe and effective" to treat a.. .. . 26
particular condition before approving it. To determine whether a drug is
"safe and effective," the FDA may apply a cost-benefit analysis. Since the
consumer's opinion or desire is given little consideration in such an analysis,
some commentators perceive this as both "tentative" and "paternalistic."
2 7
Concerns that the FDA stifles innovation and development or, conversely,
that the FDA is too deeply involved with the pharmaceutical companies to
22. Id.
23. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2000).
24. Id.
25. Press Release, Lester M. Crawford, Acting Comm'r, U.S. Food & Drug Admin.,
FDA Acts to Strengthen the Safety Program for Marketed Drugs (Nov. 5, 2004),
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/2004/NEW0113 lhtml.
26. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d).
27. Richard Epstein has expressed his disagreement with the FDA's cost-benefit
analysis:
Often, [the FDA] relies on cost-benefit analyses that can only be
termed, at best, tentative and, at worst, primitive. Its entire effort to
make better judgments on what treatments should be used and why
smacks of an unthinking paternalism that reveals its own institutional
shortcomings, as well as those of its critics who plump for stricter
regulation.
Epstein, supra note 8, at 747.
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make objective decisions about drug safety, are ever-present in critiques of
the approval process.2 8 Although the FDA approval process may eliminate
some risks, adverse events will inevitably occur after approval and outside
the controlled trial setting.
29
B. Post-Market Surveillance of Drugs
The FDA sponsored a 2004 Institute of Medicine study of the drug
safety system, which reported that the CDER devoted less time and fewer
resources to post-market surveillance of drugs; rather, it devoted most of its
resources to the approval of new drugs. 30 This finding may be correlated to
the large amount of CDER funding derived from Prescription Drug User
Fees (PDUFs).31
28. Markel, supra note 5, at 2490-91.
Early during Reagan's first term, FDA budgets were severely cut,
legal investigations were canceled, and new policies were developed
that would overload workers with paperwork rather than allowing
them to devote more time to pursuing errant pharmaceutical
companies and other businesses. This trend progressed through the
early 1990s, and while the deregulation slide was curtailed somewhat
during the Clinton years, critics increasingly complained that the
FDA was developing alliances that were too close to the industries it
was charged with regulating. The rationale for these changes was the
popular argument that the FDA inhibited business profits and
therefore inhibited research and development, cost too much money
to operate, and failed to uphold its primary missions.
Id.
29. See Ensuring Drug Safety: Where do We Go From Here?: Hearing on Drug
Safety Before the S. Comm. on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, 109th Cong. 40-
47 (2005) (statement of Dr. Bruce Psaty, Co-director of the Cardiovascular Health and
Research Unit and professor of medicine, epidemiology, and health services, University
of Washington) [hereinafter Psaty]; see also Michael Friedman et al., The Safety of Newly
Approved Medicines, 281 JAMA 1728, 1732 (1999) ("[D]rug approvals are made on the
basis of limited information and more inevitably learned as a drug becomes widely
used.").
30. See The Future of Drug Safety: Promoting and Protecting the Health of the
Public, THE INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT'L ACADEMICS, Sep. 22, 2006,
http://www.iom.edu/ CMS/3793/ 26341/37329.aspx.
31. Gregory D. Curfman et al., Blueprint for a Stronger Food and Drug
Administration, 355 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1821 (2006).
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In an effort to promote drug safety in 2005, the FDA created and
authorized a Drug Safety Oversight Board to review and analyze adverse
drug event reports, drug use data, healthcare administrative data,
epidemiologic and observation studies, clinical trials, and other surveillance
systems. 32 In 2005, there were 5 safety drug recalls, 109 safety alerts for
drugs, 25 to 70 safety-related labeling changes per month, and over 460,000
reports of adverse drug events. 33  A 2006 United States Government
Accountability Office (GAO) study reported that improvement was still
needed in the FDA's post-market oversight programs. 34 The study attributed
the FDA's insufficient post-market surveillance largely to a lack of effective
organization and oversight within the FDA and the limited nature of
available data.35 One oversight program, MedWatch, exemplifies some of
the frustrations that the FDA faces in tracking drugs that have reached the
market. MedWatch encourages doctors to voluntarily report adverse
events. 36 However, the program is often labeled inadequate because adverse
events are under-reported, and reported events fail to produce adequate and
reliable information.
37
32. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH,
REPORT TO THE NATION 2005: IMPROVING PUBLIC HEALTH THROUGH HUMAN DRUGS 4
(2005).
33. Id. at 35-43.
34. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, DRUG SAFETY: IMPROVEMENT NEEDED IN
FDA's POSTMARKET DECISION-MAKFNG AND OVERSIGHT PROCESS (2006) [hereinafter
GAO DRUG SAFETY REPORT].
FDA lacks clear and effective processes for making decisions about,
and providing management oversight of, postmarket safety issues.
The process has been limited by a lack of clarity about how decisions
are made and about organizational roles, insufficient oversight by
management, and data constraints. GAO observed that there is a lack




36. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., MedWatch: The FDA Safety Information and
Adverse Event Reporting Program, Voluntary Reporting by Health Professionals, http://
www.fda.gov/medwatch/report/hcp.htm (last visited Feb 22, 2008).
37. See Fontanarosa et al., supra note 7, at 2647; see also Psaty, supra note 29
(finding that adverse events are often under-reported, perhaps largely due to fear of legal
2008]
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Public recalls of drugs and well-publicized lawsuits resulting from
adverse drug reactions have added fuel to the movement for reforming the
FDA's surveillance of approved drugs.38 Anticipating the renewal of the
Prescription Drug User Fees Act in 2007, drug companies and the FDA
engaged in talks to determine how to best restructure the program. 39 In
January of 2007, the FDA published its recommendations for reauthorization
of the PDUF program. The recommendations include an $87.4 million
increase in user fee collections, of which $29.3 million would be put towards
ensuring post-market safety of medications. 4 1 The Senate and the House
passed similar bills in the summer of 2007.42 Ultimately, the bill approved
by Congress and signed into law by the president, the Food and Drug
Administration Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAA), gave the FDA new tools
for monitoring drug safety.43 The FDAA grants the FDA the authority to
require safety studies by drug companies, to limit distribution of certain
drugs, and to require label changes.
ramifications, and those adverse events that are reported fail to provide the level of
documentation necessary to definitively attribute causation to the drug).
38. See generally Gardiner Harris, Regulation Redefined: The FDA Shifts Focus; At
FDA, Strong Ties and Less Monitoring, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2004, at AI, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/06/health/06fda.html?ex= I 164949200&en=d3 I b327e2
d66f4ed&ei=507; Friedman, supra note 29, at 1728 ("Between September 1997 and
September 1998, five prescription medications were removed from the market because of
unexpected adverse reactions. These actions raised questions about whether unsafe
products were reaching the US market because the drug approval process had been
expedited under the Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992.").
39. Jeffrey Young, Democratic Leaders Eye FDA Reform, THE HILL, Nov. 6, 2006,
available at http://thehill.com/thehill/export/TheHilI/News/TheExecutive/
111606_fda.html.
40. Prescription Drug User Fee Act, Public Meeting Notice, 72 Fed. Reg. 9, 1743,
1745-52 (Jan. 16, 2007).
41. Id. at 1746-47.
42. S. 1082, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 2900, 110th Cong. (2007).
43. See Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-
85, 121 Stat. 823 (2007).
44. Id.
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Previously, the FDA could not require the post-market studies of drugs
and rarely required a pharmaceutical company to remove a drug from the
market, nor could it require continued availability or sale of a drug.45 While
the FDA could request pharmaceutical companies to continue collecting data
46and performing medical trials after drug approval, this scheme has provedS47
ineffective in the past due to lack of compliance and under-reporting.
Perhaps the most accurate post-approval research was initiated by
pharmaceutical companies themselves in order to target future uses of a
drug, although many may have avoided reporting negative information by
discontinuing studies with questionable results. 4 8  In 2006, the GAO
recommended that Congress expand the FDA's authority to require drug
sponsors to conduct post-market studies.49 And as of October 1, 2007, if the
FDA is made aware of "new safety information," it may require
pharmaceutical companies to conduct postapproval studies or trials. 50 "New
safety information" is defined as
information derived from a clinical trial, an adverse event report, a
postapproval study, or peer-reviewed biomedical literature; data
derived from the postmarket risk identification and analysis system;
or other scientific data deemed appropriate by the Secretary about-a
serious risk or any unexpected serious risk associated with the drug
that the Secretary has been aware of .... 51
The FDAA also authorizes the FDA to order a label change if new safety
information becomes available that the FDA believes should be included in
45. GAO DRUG SAFETY REPORT, supra note 34, at 4.
46. See Psaty, supra note 29.
47. Id. ("Pharmaceutical companies often promise post-marketing clinical trials as a
condition of approval. In practice, however, more than half of these promised studies...
have not been started."); see also Fontanarosa et al., supra note 7, at 2647.
48. See Psaty, supra note 29; see also Fontanarosa et al., supra note 7, at 2649
(indicating that where results are seemingly detrimental to the company, it is likely that
the study will be discontinued and any reports of the findings will be downplayed).
49. GAO DRUG SAFETY REPORT, supra note 34, at 6.
50. Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85,
121 Stat. 923 (codified as amended at 21 USC § 355(o)(3) (2007)).
51. Id. at 121 Stat. 927 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355-1).
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525
the label . 5 The requirement of "Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies"
(REMS) was also included in the FDAA. 5 3 REMS are plans submitted by
drug applicants when it is determined by the FDA that a REMS plan is
necessary to mitigate the risks of some drugs.54 The FDA may require a
REMS plan at the time of drug approval or after drug approval when new
safety information becomes available.
5 5
C. Labeling and Preemption
Of particular relevance when considering the unpredictable nature of
new drugs, is the proliferation of off-label prescribing by doctors, arguably a
practice that has been encouraged by the FDA. 56 Off-label prescribing is the
practice of prescribing an FDA-approved drug for an unapproved use, for
example prescribing an asthma medication for pulmonary disease. 57 The
support for off-label use is widespread in the medical community as doctors,
pharmaceutical companies, and the federal government acknowledge the
potential benefits of such prescribing practices. 58  The case for off-label
prescribing is undeniably strong as the practice gives credence to a doctor's
52. Id. at 121 Stat. 923 (codified as amended at 21 USC § 355(o)(4)(A)).
53. Id. at 121 Stat. 926 (codified as amended at 21 USC § 355-1).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. James Beck & Elizabeth Azari, FDA, Off-Label Use, and Informed Consent:
Debunking Myths and Misconceptions, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 71, 79 (1998) (
"'[U]napproved' or more precisely 'unlabelled' uses may be appropriate and rational in
certain circumstances .... " ) (quoting 12 FDA DRUG BULLETIN 4-5 (1982)); id. at 103
(finding that current law allows pharmaceutical companies to promote off-label uses to
providers of health care); Mitchell Oates,Note, Facilitating Informed Medical Treatment
Through Production and Disclosure of Research into Off-Label Uses of Pharmaceuticals,
80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1272, 1280-81 (2005) ("Indeed, many believe a hands-off approach
provides a desirable level of freedom, allowing practitioners to pursue innovative
treatment strategies, and facilitating the discovery of new uses.").
57. See Oates, supra note 56, at 1273.
58. See Beck & Azari, supra note 56, at 79-80 (finding that "[o]ff-label use is not
only legal and ethical, but it is a common and integral feature of medical practice" and
citing estimates finding that prescriptions for off-label uses may account for "as high as
60%" of "the approximately 1.6 billion prescriptions written each year").
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autonomy in treating his/her patient, avoids the burden of seeking FDA
approval for every usage of a particular drug, and, most importantly, often
helps suffering individuals.
59
Recently, the FDA revised its drug labeling policies in an effort to
create a more physician-friendly format but sparked some controversy due to
language in the preamble. The preamble asserted that state drug labeling
laws were preempted by the FDA's labeling requirements thereby
potentially eliminating certain tort suits against pharmaceutical companies.
The preemption language in the preamble of the FDA's final labeling rule,
which took effect on June 30, 2006, did not go unnoticed by critics. The
FDA claims the authority to preempt state labeling requirements as "the
expert Federal public health agency charged by Congress with ensuring that
drugs are safe and effective." 62  The FDA asserts further that the drug
approval process is rigorous and results in "authoritative conclusions" as to
the effective uses of a drug, which are adequately described along with any
risks and benefits of the product in an approved label.63 The FDA explains
that state laws on labeling conflict with the FDA's designation as the expert
in drug regulation, thus preemption is necessary. 64 The FDA argues that
varied labeling requirements may have detrimental consequences for the
59. See Steven Salbu, Off-Label Use, Prescription, and Marketing of FDA-Approved
Drugs: An Assessment of Legislative and Regulatory Policy, 51 FLA. L. REV. 181, 193-
94 (1999) (citing off-label uses of cancer drugs and drugs prescribed for healing wounds
as instances in which off-labeling has relieved suffering).
60. See Gary Young, FDA Strategy Would Pre-empt Tort Suits, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 1,
2004, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id= 1076428430132.
61. See FDA Revises Labeling for Doctors; States express Concerns about
Preemption, 74 U.S.L.W. 27, Jan. 24, 2006; Young, supra note 60 ("Under the Bush
administration, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has adopted a novel legal
strategy that would, if successful, leave many consumers claiming injury from
pharmaceuticals or medical devices with no recourse to tort law, critics and attorneys
charge.").
62. Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug
and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3921 (Jan. 24, 2006).
63. Id.
64. Id.; see, e.g., Pharm. Res. & Mfrs. of Am. v. Dist. of Columbia. 406 F. Supp. 2d.
56, 65 (D.D.C. 2005).
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consumer and the doctor.65  Several areas in which the FDA claims to
categorically preempt state law were listed in the preamble.
66
One case relied upon by the FDA in supporting its case for
preemption, Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Committee, implicates off-.... 67
label prescribing in the context of preemption. The class-action lawsuit
alleged that the FDA was defrauded during the approval process for a type
of bone screw that was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs' injuries.68 Two
relevant arguments were posited by plaintiffs during the bone screw
litigation: that the incentive for fraud was the potential for lucrative off-label
65. Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug
and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3933-35.
66. Id. at 3936. The categories listed are: failure to warn claims against a drug
manufacturer when a risk is included in the label but not in the "highlights section" or
when risks are not included in an advertisement but are otherwise found in the labeling;
failure to warn claims when the sponsor fails to include contraindications or warnings
that are not supported by evidence meeting the standards of the FDA; failure to warn
claims for a failure to include in the label or advertisement a statement regarding a risk
that has been proposed to the FDA for inclusion but is not required at the time of the
claim; failure to warn claims based on the absence of labeling or advertising statements
that have been substantively prohibited by the FDA in such a format; and claims that a
pharmaceutical company breached an obligation to the plaintiff based on statements
approved by the FDA unless the FDA finds that the company withheld material
information relating to the statement. Id.
67. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (1998). The plaintiff in
this case alleged that the defendant pharmaceutical company misrepresented material
facts as to the usage of its medical device, bone screws, when it applied to the FDA for
approval and that the FDA would not have approved the bone screws for sale had the
FDA been apprised of such material facts. More concisely put, but for defendant's
misrepresentation, the plaintiffs would not have been injured because the bone screws
would not have been approved for sale. Id.
68. Id. at 348.
We hold that the plaintiffs' state-law fraud-on-the-FDA claims
conflict with, and are therefore impliedly pre-empted by federal law.
The conflict stems from the fact that the federal statutory scheme
amply empowers the FDA to punish and deter fraud against the
Agency, and that this authority is used by the Agency to achieve a
somewhat delicate balance of statutory objectives. The balance
sought by the Agency can be skewed by allowing fraud-on-the-FDA
claims under state tort law.
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prescribing, and that the manufacturer was aware that the product would be
used for other purposes than those approved in its New Medical Device
Application. 69 The Court held that Congress intended to empower the FDA
to address fraud against the agency and that state tort suits alleging fraud on
the FDA interfered with that power.70 The Court's finding that fraud on the
federal government was impliedly preempted by the FDA is relevant in the
context of pharmaceuticals not only because it suggests that the Court is
receptive to "implied preemption" arguments, but also because it applies
71such logic in the context of off-label prescriptions.
II. PHARMACOGENOMICS- A UNIQUE SPECIES OF DRUGS
A. What is at Stake?
Pharmacogenomics not only represents advances in actual drug
therapy, it represents the promise of efficiency in drug trials and treatment.
The actual cost of drug development is debated: some suggest that drug
development for FDA approval costs close to $100 million while others
argue that the cost during drug development alone is close to $400 million
per drug. 73 Additionally, it is estimated that the total time between the start
of drug development to market is close to 180 months. 4 The identification
of gene variations in drug metabolism will allow researchers to narrow drug
trials according to a particular genotype, rather than testing on diverse
69. Id. at 341.
70. Id. at 348.
71. Id.
72. Human Genome Project, supra note 1.
73. At present, the cost of drug research and development is disputed. Public
Citizen, a consumer advocacy group suggests that research and development costs only
$110 million to obtain FDA approval. However, the Tufts Center for the Study of Drug
Development argues that the expenditures from the development period are around $400
million per approved drug and the total capitalized cost is generally around $800 million
per approved drug. DiMasi, supra note 15.
74. Oldham, supra note 6 (arguing that while the actual drug approval time has
decreased, the development time has increased).
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populations and genotypes.75 One commentator observes that it is prohibited
by federal regulation for the IRB to approve a clinical trial that would
expose a subject to a known risk; thus, future researchers may not have the
choice to include a more random group of subjects. 76 Others are concerned
that this will lead to less accurate trials and inferior understanding of drugs.
77
While pharmacogenomics could potentially save a pharmaceutical
company money in research and trials, it may cost them in revenue.78 Drugs
that are designed for a specific genotype are unlikely to produce the
"blockbuster effect" or commercial demand of drugs aimed at the general
population.79 Off-label prescribing could provide additional revenue for a
company producing genotype specific drugs, 8° but this practice seems
inherently more dangerous due to the limited availability of facts to predict
the general public's response to the drug. Additionally, pharmacogenomics
creates an increased risk of disparity in treatment among genotypes.8 The
possibility of pharmaceutical companies focusing pharmacogenomic drug
development on more common genotypes is a concern.
82
Despite the promise of pharmacogenomics, an array of continuing
and novel concerns will arise as the FDA is faced with the task of approving
75. Mark A. Rothstein & Phyllis Griffin Epps, Ethical and Legal Implications of
Pharmacogenomics, 2 NATURE REVIEWS GENETICS 228 (2001)..
76. Tilo Mandry, Legal Implications of Pharmacogenomics Regarding Drug Trials,
Drug Labeling, and Genetic Testing for Drug Prescription: An International Approach,
59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 519, 523 (2004).
77. See Rothstein & Epps, supra note 75 at 228.
78. When drugs are made with a specific population, in this case a genotype, in
mind, it is unlikely that they will have the "blockbuster" effect of drugs presently on the
market. Rothstein, supra note 75, at 228-29; see also DiMasi, supra note 15.
79. See Rothstein & Epps, supra note 75, at 228-29.
80. But see Phyllis Griffin Epps, White Pill, Yellow Pill, Red Pill, Brown Pill:
Pharmacogenomics and the Changing Face of Medicine, HEALTH L. PERSP. May 30,
2000, hitp://www.law.uh.edu/healthlaw/perspectives/genetics/2000053OWhitepill.html
(noting that the Orphan Drug Act creates incentives for drug manufacturers to research
and develop drugs for rare diseases through tax credits and exclusive marketing rights).
81. Rothstein & Epps, supra note 75; see generally Epps, supra note 80.
82. Rothstein & Epps, supra note 75; see generally Epps, supra note 80.
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pharmacogenomic drugs. It is inevitable that there will be problems in the
regulation of pharmacogenomics. For example, limited trials will yield
limited data,83 which may prove dangerous especially in the context of off-
label prescriptions. But to disallow off-label prescriptions is "paternalistic"
and could be devastating to the people who rely on the availability of off-
label drugs.84 Other problems may include disinterest by the pharmaceutical
companies as the financial incentive is minimal and the possibility of
liability is great, they may decline to produce drugs that are genomically
engineered, preferring "blockbuster," one-size-fits-all drugs. 85 Finally, the
already realized problem of the FDA's weak post-market surveillance will
undoubtedly hinder pharmacogenomics as many of the uncertainties of
pharmacogenomics will be discovered only after the approval process.
86
B. FDA and Pharmacogenomic Drug Development
The FDA has taken steps to anticipate the development of
pharmacogenomics. In 2003, the FDA published a draft guidance document
for public comment followed by the publication of guidance regarding
pharmacogenomics role in data submissions in March of 2005.87 The 2003
draft proposal included definitions by which drug companies or sponsors are
to classify their submitted data, and developed algorithms requiring sponsors
to submit data obtained in the Investigative New Drug Application stage if it
88later will be used to enroll or exclude persons from a trial. In the INDA
83. See Rothstein & Epps, supra note 75, at 228 ("A group that reflects the diversity
of the population yields information on how a drug will behave in a greater number of
people. If the clinical trial group is smaller, or is less genotypically diverse, there is a
greater risk that some side effects will go undetected.").
84. See Beck & Azari, supra note 56, at 76-85.
85. Rothstein & Epps, supra note 75, at 229 ("Incentives for pharmaceutical
companies to invest time, effort and resources into the development of drugs to treat
limited populations are few ... .
86. Id.
87. Michelle Meadows, Genomics and Personalized Medicine, FDA CONSUMER
MAGAZINE, Nov.-Dec. 2005, available at: http://www.fda.gov/fdac/features/2005/
605_genomics.html (explaining that presently pharmacogenomic data are considered
research and exploratory in nature and are not required to be submitted).
88. Woodcock, supra note 1, at 95-97.
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stage, the FDA has developed a structure in which the applicant may
confidentially report his pharmacogenomic findings through the Voluntary
Genomic Data Submission (VGDS). 89 Included in submissions, the FDA
requests: a full clinical study report providing a clear explanation of the
critical design features of the study; information on the methods used to
implement the study; relevant individual patient data; any protocol
deviations; individual adverse events; pharmacogenomic and other
biomarker datasets; and correlations between the clinical and
pharmacogenomic data. 9° The FDA envisions a system in which the agency,
researchers, and drug companies work together to gather data to advance
pharmacogenomics.
In terms of labeling, the FDA anticipates that as genetic tests become
more common, information regarding genotype may begin to appear on
labels to add a predictive value as to how a particular patient will metabolize
a drug.92 Eventually the FDA predicts that pharmacogenomic labels will
include directions to doctors in terms of which genetic tests to run prior to
prescription. 93 At present there exists at least one example of such labeling.
A leukemia drug includes in its label an alert to doctors regarding a test for
89. Id. at 96-97.
90. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, PHARMACOGENOMIC
DATA SUBMISSIONS 8-9 (2005), available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/guidance/
6400fnl.pdf.
91. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., INNOVATION OR STAGNATION: CHALLENGE AND
OPPORTUNITY ON THE CRITICAL PATH TO NEW MEDICAL PRODUCTS (2004),
http://www.fda.gov/oc/initiatives/criticalpath/whitepaper.html. The FDA has explained
how pharmacogenomics can be advanced:
The product development problems we are seeing today can be
addressed, in part, through an aggressive, collaborative effort to
create a new generation of performance standards and predictive
tools. The new tools will match and move forward new scientific
innovations and will build on knowledge delivered by recent
advances in science, such as bioinformatics, genomics, imaging
technologies, and materials science.
Id.
92. Woodcock, supra note 1, at 98-99.
93. Id. at 99.
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certain genetic variants considered to respond adversely to the drug.
94
However, this particular label does not require such testing prior to
S - 95
prescription.
Ill. PAST LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO DRUG DEVELOPMENT
OBSTACLES
A. Responses to Drug Shortages and the Tort System
While the FDA approval process represents a regulatory approach to
advancing public health, some consider the threat of lawsuit to be an
effective protection for public health and safety.96 The tort system relies on
individual patients bringing lawsuits for individual harms to deter future
risky acts through threat of economic sanction. 97 A general criticism of the
tort system is that only a small percentage of persons bringing suits have
actually been injured, which results in a system that fosters excessive
treatments and tests ordered by doctors, which do not enhance the quality of
a patient's care. 98 Drug companies seek to offset the risk of costly lawsuits
through selectivity in drug development. 99  This may result in a drug
94. Susanne Haga & Wylie Burke, Using Pharmacogenetics to Improve Drug Safety
and Efficacy, 291 JAMA 2869, 2869-70 (2004).
95. Id. at 2870. Michelle J. White, The Value of Liability in Medical Malpractice, 82
HEALTH AFFAIRS 75 (1994).
96. See White, supra note 95, at 75.
97. See James R. Copland, A Message from the Director, The Lawsuit Industry's
Effect on American Healthcare, TRIAL LAWYERS, INC., HEALTH CARE, 2005, available at
http://www.triallawyersinc.com/healthcare/hc0l .html.
98. Barbara J. Evans & David A. Flockhart, The Unfinished Business of U.S. Drug
Safety Regulations, 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 45, 52.
Unsafe prescribing practices may go unpunished even as prudent
ones draw large penalties. The tort system provides a "fragmented
and capricious response" to injuries. Effective deterrence requires
precision: those claims-and only those claims-that involve a
negligent injury should be compensated. Lacking this precision, drug
injury lawsuits are not a strong compliance mechanism.
Id.
99. See Epstein, supra note 8, at 757-58.
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company choosing not to develop effective drugs due to the possibility that
they could lose economic viability after lawsuits. 00  While deterring
negligent practices within the medical and pharmaceutical industry is a
benefit of the tort system, the risk of deterring drug development and
innovative medical care is a disadvantage.
The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Program was developed due
to concerns that pharmaceutical companies derive little revenue from
vaccines and that an onslaught of lawsuits threaten the nation's vaccine
supply. 101 The program may be viewed as a type of tort reform driven by a
public health necessity. 0 2 Another tort shield for pharmaceutical companies
is the learned intermediary doctrine. 10 3 A doctor who prescribes a particular
drug owes several duties to her patient and can be held liable if she fails to
abide by those duties. 10 4 The learned intermediary doctrine provides that
pharmaceutical companies have no duty to warn a consumer of the dangers
of the dru 5so long as adequate warning was provided to prescribing
physicians. The doctrine is based on a theory that the doctor is in the best
position to evaluate the information provided by the manufacturer
concerning the risks and benefits of its drug and to evaluate the individual
needs and susceptibilities of the patient.l°6
100. Copland, supra note 97.
101. About the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, http://
www.usdoj.gov/civil/torts/const/vicp/about.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2008).
102. Compensating Vaccine Injuries: Are Reforms Needed?: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, & Human Res. of the H. Comm. on Gov't
Reform, 106th Cong. 106-07 (1999) (statement of Thomas E. Balbier, Jr., Director,
National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program).
103. 63A AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 1200 (2008).
104. Id.; see also 3 STEVEN E. PEGALIS, AMERICAN LAW OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE §
17:9 (2005). First, a doctor must make an accurate diagnosis, have a full drug history and
be familiar with the drug actions and any potential drug interactions. The doctor must
also use reasonable care in the manner in which she prescribes the medication, and has a
duty to advise the patient of the diagnosis made and the medications prescribed, including
their risks and side effects. Id.
105. 63A AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 1200 (2008).
106. Diane Schmauder Kane, Annotation, Construction and Application of Learned-
Intermediary Doctrine, 57 A.L.R. 5TH 1, § 2[a] (1998).
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Similarly, preemption by the FDA of lawsuits based on labeling
limits the availability of tort remedies for injured persons,1
07 subsequently
protecting the manufacturer and shielding doctors from claims alleging
failure to adequately inform of risk information.
0 8 Whether the reach of the
FDA's preemption is as broad as its ambition is unclear. Preambles to final
rules are allotted a limited amount of deference;
10 9 the FDA argues implied
preemption in prescription drug labeling as Congress has not explicitly
granted the FDA such preemptive authority. 
" 0
Nevertheless, prior to the FDA's inclusion of preemption language in
any of its regulations, courts have been willing to recognize FDA
preemption."' The FDA has submitted various amicus briefs in support of
defendant pharmaceutical companies claiming that FDA regulations preempt
state law in matters of drug labeling. 12 Recently, a federal trial court
107. See generally MARGARET H. CLUNE, CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, STEALTH
TORT REFORM: HOW THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S AGGRESSIVE USE OF THE PREEMPTION
DOCTRINE HURTS CONSUMERS 1 (2004), available at http://
www.progressiveregulation.org/articles/preemption.pdf, Allison Zieve & Brian
Wolfman, The FDA's Argument for Eradicating State Tort Law: Why It Is Wrong and
Warrants No Deference, 21 Toxic L. Rep. (BNA) 516 (May 25, 2006).
108. See Young, supra note 59.
109. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI, § 2. The Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution establishes that federal law "shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." Id. This is defined as prohibiting state law
from interfering with or establishing laws contrary to those of Congress. See Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824). However, those opposing FDA preemption also argue that
courts should give little deference to preamble language. Preambles cannot impose legal
requirements, and therefore do not carry the force of law. See Zieve & Wolfman, supra
note 107, at 10.
110. Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug
and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3934 (Jan. 24, 2006) (to be codified at 21
C.F.R. pts. 201, 314 & 601).
111. See Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 714
(1985) (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842-45 (1984)) (holding that in the absence of expressed congressional intent, the scope
of the FDA's preemptive authority is determined by the FDA's position).
112. Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug
and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3935.
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opinion addressed the issue of preemption directly in a failure-to-warn suit, a
tort suit based on a drug manufacturer's failure to include a suicide warning
on the label of certain drugs.1 3 The FDA supported the defendant by
submitting an amicus brief.11 4 The holding turned on the authority of the
FDA to regulate drugs. The court found that through the FDCA, Congress
had granted the FDA the power to regulate "the specifics of drug labeling,
making important judgments of what is required for safety of the consuming
public, what new drugs may appear in the marketplace, and what warnings
their instructions and labels must carry."' 115  The court noted that the
Supreme Court gives deference to an agency's own interpretation of the
statute and regulations1 6 and that preemptive intent may be inferred from
amicus briefs. 17
Since the publication of the new labeling rule, courts have been
divided on how much weight to afford the preemption claims in the
preamble. In In re Bextra and Celebrex Marketing Sales Practices and
Product Liability Litigation, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of California dismissed a failure-to-warn claim based on state tort law
against a drug company reasoning that the FDA had implied authority to
determine whether state laws conflict with FDA regulations due to its
authority over drug safety delegated by Congress.' 18 However, in McNellis
v. Pfizer, Inc., a federal district court in New Jersey declined to give
deference to the FDA's preamble and determined that New Jersey failure-to-
warn claims were not in conflict with the FDA regulations. 19 A petition for
certiorari from a Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision, affirming a
finding of summary judgment for the defendant because petitioner's claims
113. Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 514 (E.D. Pa. 2006).
114. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 1, Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 432
F. Supp. 2d 514 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (No. 05-5500).
115. Id. at518.
116. Id. at 525.
117. Id.
118. See In re Bextra & Celebrex Marketing Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., No.
M: 05-1699 CRB, 2006 WL 2374742 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2007).
119. See McNellis ex rel. DeAngelis v. Pfizer, Inc., No. Civ. 05-1286 (JBS), 2006 WL
2819046 (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 2006).
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were preempted, was heard by the Supreme Court this term.120 The factual
underpinnings of the case involve a medical device and the issue before the
Court is whether the Medical Device Act's express preemption provision is a
bar to tort claims based on state law.' 21 The Court affirmed the ruling of the
Court of Appeals, holding that the preemption clause contained in the
Medical Device Amendments of 1976 prohibits state tort suits based on the
safety of a device that received FDA approval. 122 The Court noted that the
preemption clause does not prevent a state from providing a parallel remedy
when a claim is based on a violation of FDA regulation. 23 This opinion is
not necessarily determinative when considering drugs since the Medical
Device Act includes an express preemption clause,' 2 whereas the FDCA
does not include one. Instead, its preemption claim is based on implied or
field preemption. However, it is noteworthy that Justice Scalia, writing for
the majority, directly addresses the dissent's contention that tort lawsuits are
permitted in the case of drugs. Justice Scalia dismissed this contention as
"assumed" and "by hypothesis."' 125
B. Responses to Lulls in Drug Development
When drugs were not being produced for 'orphan diseases' because
of the lack of financial incentive to create drugs for small populations, a
helpful response to the problem was created by the Orphan Drug Act of
1983 (ODA). 126  The Act was passed with the goal of spurring the
pharmaceutical industry into developing drugs to treat rare diseases, which
are those affecting fewer than 200,000 Americans.' 27 Also covered by the
ODA are drugs with high development costs that are unlikely to be recouped
120. See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008).
121. Id.
122. Riegel, 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008).
123. Id.
124. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2000).
125. Riegel, 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008).
126. Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983) (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 360aa-360ee (2000)).
127. 21 U.S.C. § 360ee(b)(2)(1)(A) (2000).
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by sales in the United States. 2 8 If an NDA for an orphan drug is approved,
the FDA may not approve NDAs for the particular orphan drug from other
applicants until seven years from the date of original approval. 129  In
addition to the reward of market exclusivity for seven years, the ODA
provides research grants and tax credits to pharmaceutical developers
working in the area. Ongoing studies receive priority in funding while the
remainder of available funds is awarded to new studies. 131 On average, the
Office of Orphan Product Development funds between twelve and fifteen
new studies per year. 132 The ODA provides an effective means to reach its
goal of drug development for rare diseases: by 2003, over 250 treatments for
orphan diseases were approved in the United States contrasted to the mere
ten that had been developed prior to the ODA.
133
C. Recent Legislative Efforts
After several high profile lawsuits stemming from 2004 drug
withdrawals, and Congress passing to Democratic control in 2006, the
present political climate became conducive to reforms aimed at the FDA's
failure to adequately follow the safety of approved drugs. 1
34
128. Id. § 360ee(b)(2)(l)(B).
129. Id. § 360cc(a); but see id. § 360cc(b)(1) (stating that if the Secretary of Health
and Human Services finds that the approved entity cannot assure the availability of
sufficient production of the drug, then after notice and opportunity to respond is given to
the approved applicant, the Secretary may approve the approval of another NDA for the
same orphan disease prior to the expiration of seven years).
130. Frequently Asked Questions Concerning the OOPD Grant Program,
http://www.fda.gov/orphan/grants/faq.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2007) (indicating that per
annum clinical trials for orphan drugs are presently awarded grants not exceeding
$200,000 during Phase 1, and grants equaling up to $350,000 during Phases II and Ill).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Carlos Rados, Orphan Products, Hope For People with Rare Diseases, FDA
CONSUMER MAGAZINE, Nov.-Dec. 2003, available at http://www.fda.gov/fdac/features/
2003/603_orphan.html.
134. Jeffrey Young, Democratic Leaders Eye FDA Reforms, THE HILL, Nov. 16,
2006, at I1, available at
http://www.thehill.com/thehill/export/TheHill/News/TheExecutive/ 111606 fda.html.
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Previously, Senator Grassley introduced the "Food and Drug
Administration Act of 2005,"'l35 which proposed the establishment of a
"Center for Postmarket Drug Evaluation and Research" within the FDA.
The "Center for Postmarket Drug Evaluation and Research" was authorized
to require post-market surveillance of approved drugs by drug companies, to
study the results of postmarket surveillance programs, to make information
from such studies available to the public through publication in the Federal
Register and on a website, and to take appropriate action when a drug
presents an unreasonable risk.
136  Akin to a cost-benefit analysis, the
determination of an unreasonable risk would be determined by "the risk in
relations to the known benefits of such drug or 
biological product."' 
37
Similarly, Senators Enzi and Kennedy introduced the "Enhancing
Drug Safety and Innovation Act of 2006," which would require
pharmaceutical companies to create a Risk Evaluation and Management
Strategy (REMS). The REMS plan would include a requirement of regular
reports on adverse events involving new drugs, include yearly reviews for
the first three years after approval of a drug, and give the FDA the ability to
require post-market clinical trials and studies by the pharmaceutical
companies to penalize non-compliance.
138 The results from Phase Ill and
Phase IV clinical trials would be publicly posted.
139 Finally, the legislation
would create a Drug Safety Oversight Board to handle disputes between
drug companies and the FDA, as well as create the Reagan-Udall Institute
for Applied Biomedical Research to study proposals to reduce the time for
new drug approval.
140
The bill that ultimately passed, the FDAA, re-authorized the
collection and spending of user fees by the FDA to expedite drug approval
and to continue monitoring prescription drugs once they are approved and
enter the market. 141 The FDAA requires the registration of all clinical trials
135. S. 930, 109th Cong. (2005).
136. Id. sec. 2(a), § 507(b)(1) (amending 21 U.S.C. § 351).
137. Id.
138. S. 3807, 109th Cong. sec. 101, § 505(o) (2006) (amending 21 U.S.C. § 355).
139. Id. sec. 101, § 505(o)(4)(c) (amending 21 U.S.C. § 355).
140. Id. sec. 101, § 505(o)(2)(E) (amending 21 U.S.C. § 355).
141. See Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-
85, sec. 801(a), § 402, 121 Stat. 823, 904-20.
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and the publication of clinical trial results for approved drugs and devices.
42
Drug applicants must now also include study result in a results data bank,
which will be available to the pubic on the internet.1 43 The FDA is also
authorized to order post-approval studies or clinical trials of a drug when
new safety information is present.144 Yet, this power is not unlimited, as the
FDA may require a post-market approval study only after it becomes aware
of new safety information and determines that the existing post-market
surveillance of the drug is insufficient. 45 The FDA may also order a label
change when it believes that new safety information should be included in
the drug label. 146 However, the pharmaceutical company is permitted to
provide its recommendations for changes to the labeling or to submit its
argument for why changes are unnecessary. 147 Only after discussions with a
pharmaceutical company regarding its resistance to a label change may the
FDA order a label change, which may then be appealed. 148  A Risk
Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS) plan may also be required by
the FDA. 149 When deciding whether a REMS plan is necessary, the FDA
evaluates a number of factors, including the size of the population that will
use the drug, the seriousness of the condition treated by the drug, the
expected benefit of the drug, the duration of treatment, the seriousness of
known adverse events, and whether the drug is a new molecular entity.'
50
The FDA is also required to develop post-market risk identification and
analysis methods. 151 A REMS plan must be submitted by the
142. See id.
143. Id.
144. Id. sec. 901(a), § 505, 121 Stat. at 922-26.
145. See id. sec. 901(b), § 505-1, 121 Stat. at 926-38.
146. Id. sec. 901(a), § 505, 121 Stat. at 922-26.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. sec. 901(b), § 505-1(a)(1), 121 Stat. at 926.
150. Id.
151. Id. sec. 901(b), § 505-1(a)(2)(B), 121 Stat. at 927.
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pharmaceutical company within 120 days of notice by the FDA. 152 The
REMS plan must include assessments at eighteen months, three years, and
seven years. 153 Additionally, a REMS plan may suggest that healthcare
practitioners have specialized training, patients enroll in a registry, and that a
medication guide and patient package insert be developed.
154  Failure of
drug companies to comply with any of these new requirements can result in
fines. 155
IV. APPLICABILITY OF PAST RESPONSES TO
PHARMACOGENOMICS
A. Preemption
The FDA's case for preemption is compelling in the context of
pharmacogenomics. However, the past shortcomings of the FDA's post-
approval surveillance support the argument that tort suits may be necessary
as an additional check on drugs in the marketplace and as a means to
compensate those who are injured by such drugs. 156 It is extreme to pass
legislation that virtually eliminates the possibility of compensation for drug
injury victims.
157
152. Id. sec. 901, § 379g(iv), 121 Stat. at 927.
153. Id.
154. Id. sec. 901(b), § 505-1(d), 121 Stat. at 929.
155. Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85,
sec. 801(a), § 402, 121 Stat. 823, 904-20.
156. See Allison Zieve & Brian Wolfman, The FDA's Argument for Eradicating State
Tort Law: Why It Is Wrong and Warrants No Deference, 21 Toxic L. REP. (BNA) 516,
517 (May 25, 2006).
157. Gary Young, FDA Strategy Would Pre-Empt Tort Suits, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 1,
2004, http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj?PubArticlePrinterFriendlyNJL.jsp?
id=1076428430132.
Under the Bush administration, the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) has adopted a novel legal strategy that would,
if successful, leave many consumers claiming injury from
pharmaceuticals or medical devices with no recourse to tort law,
critics and attorneys charge. That strategy is pre-emption, basically
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Opponents to the FDA's preemption policy argue that there is no
direct conflict between a suit for damages and the regulatory requirements of
drug labeling.' 58 Often, labels are inadequate and must be changed after
approval; thus, the label is not a final decision. Rather, they are adjusted
with time and are developed through negotiation with the pharmaceutical
company. 159 In the context of pharmacogenomics, there is much concern
that lawsuits would be a powerful deterrent to actual drug development.
Since the profitability of pharmacogenomics is unknown, lawsuits for
damages against a pharmaceutical company may result in the removal of
some effective drugs from the market by pharmaceutical companies.'
6
0
Also, there is the possibility that a pharmaceutical company may refuse to do
research for future pharmacogenomic drugs because of the high risk and low
return of the drugs. This directly implicates the FDA's mission to provide
for safe, effective drugs to reach the market. 162 While such concerns are
reasonable, efforts to reform tort law may be more helpful than denying an
injured party judicial recourse.163 Although tort suits may explain some
industry reluctance in producing certain drugs, they do not necessitate such
drastic measures by the FDA under questionable authority. Methods to
nullification of state actions that conflict with or supplement FDA
decision.
Id.
158. Zieve & Wolfman, supra note 156, at 519. "And 'there is no general inherent
conflict between federal pre-emption of state [regulatory] requirements and the continued
vitality of state common-law damages actions.' In other words, a verdict ordering the
payment of damages does not require a drug manufacturer to do anything inconsistent
with any FDA requirement." Id.
159. Id.
160. See Rothstein & Epps, supra note 75, at 229 ("Without the opportunity to recoup
their investment, drug companies will not continue their efforts.").
161. Id.
162. FDA's Mission Statement, http://www.fda.gov/opacom/morechoices/
mission.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2008).
163. See JOINT ECON. COMM., 104TH CONG., IMPROVING THE AMERICAN LEGAL
SYSTEM: THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF TORT REFORM (1996), available at
http://www.house.gov/jec/tort/tort/tort.htm.
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counter such outside influences must be developed to ensure that new drug
development is not curtailed by fear of lawsuits.
Tort suits may provide a valuable means for individuals to receive
compensation for injury and may ensure that pharmaceutical companies are
alert and responsive to potential safety issues. 
64 While the FDA argues that
too much label information may result in confusion and individuals failing to
take advantage of available drugs, perhaps increased information is
necessary and value should be placed on the individual's choice to use or not
to use a drug rather than on the FDA's apparently imperfect 
judgment.'65
B. Orphan Drug Laws
Some of the benefits of the Orphan Drug Act (ODA) may be helpful
in encouraging drug companies to devote more time and effort into the field
of pharmacogenomics but awarding exclusive patents is unacceptable in the
field of pharmacogenomics. 166 While this is a new area and concerns about
profit may abound for pharmaceutical companies, the advantages of these
drugs' and the mission of the FDA to ensure availability preclude such an
option. More important is the availability of multiple options for all persons
and genotypes and this is better accomplished through the availability of
many treatment options rather than the exclusion of later 
developed drugs.'
68
The use of tax credits and research grants may be useful as an
incentive for those who contribute data through Voluntary Genomics Data
Submissions (VGDS). At present, the FDA suggests an incentive of
providing such information are time and cost saving benefits that will occur
by familiarizing the FDA and the drug company with new approaches to
164. See generally Zieve & Wolfman, supra note 156, at 518.
165. See generally Epstein, supra note 8, at 748 ("[T]here is no reason to place trust in
a government monopoly, especially one that has shown itself to rate false positives
(letting drugs that should be kept off the market onto the market) more highly than false
negatives (keeping drugs off the markets that should be allowed). Since warnings are not
coercive but informative, there is no need for a government monopoly.").
166. Rothstein, supra note 75, at 229 ("The United States and Japan have enacted
legislation to stimulate research and the development of orphan drugs through market
mechanisms, such as tax-based cost incentives and time-limited monopolies, with varying
degrees of governmental intervention.").
167. See supra text accompanying note 4.
168. See Epstein, supra note 8.
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pharmacogenomics and thereby avoiding future delays during review.
169
Also, the FDA suggests that this creates an opportunity for sponsors to
impact the FDA's position thereby building consensus for future
pharmacogenomic policies.' 70 At the close of 2006, approximately twenty
submissions had been made to the VGDS, which according to the FDA
"varied significantly in terms of content and focus."' 7 1 The necessity of
"standardization in data generation, normalization and submission" and
"measures of data quality" became apparent through these submissions. 172
As the process for better voluntary submissions is developed, the
administrative burden of detailing voluntary submissions may be offset by
the possibility of additional benefits in research grants.
The opportunity for discrimination is also of concern when
considering whether to adopt similar policies as that of the ODA in the field
of pharmacogenomics. When a certain genotype occurs in smaller groups of
persons and therefore has a limited market, the possibility exists that drug
manufacturers could focus on development for more prevalent genotypes.
That a certain genotype exists primarily in a particular race also implicates
unique social concerns for drug development and availability. 17 4 In the
development of pharmacogenomics, some scholars suggest that the
possibility of drug developers "cherry picking" genotypes to focus their
research is possible as "market forces dictate a higher price for the drug."'
' 75
Essentially, a pharmaceutical company realizing the expense of such a drug
may be inclined to produce drugs only for populations that are more likely to
be able to afford the drug. 176 It will be necessary for legislation to curb such
169. Genomics at FDA, Voluntary Genomics Data Submission (VGDS), http://
www.fda.gov/cder/genomics/VGDS.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2007).
170. Id.
171. Felix W. Frueh, Commentary, Impact of Microarray Data Quality on Genomic
Data Submissions to the FDA, 24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1105, 1106 (2006).
172. Id. at l106.
173. Epps, supra note 80.
174. Rothstein & Epps, supra note 75, at 228. ("The use of groups in clinical trials
that are increasingly similar genotypically raises several important ethical issues
regarding social inclusion and adequacy of current regulatory frameworks.").
175. Id. at 229.
176. Id.
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practices by creating a system to track potential discrimination and to
prohibit federal funding of companies that engage in this behavior.
C. Recent Legislative Responses
Both the Food and Drug Administration Act of 2005 and the
Enhancing Drug Safety and Innovation Act of 2006 address the failings of
the FDA in post-market surveillance. The bills suggested the establishment
oversight boards and authorization of the FDA to require post-market studies
by drug companies, and that the public should have access to the information
later phases of drug studies.177 The 2005 bill also maintained the cost-
benefit analysis for drug approval decisions. 78  This method may be
criticized as devaluing informed decisions made by patients with their
doctors as to drug choices. A cost-benefit analysis is ill-suited for
pharmacogenomics because the benefit of a drug designed for a particular
genotype may be small if quantified in terms of actual people benefited and
could therefore be denied entry into the marketplace under this analysis.
The determination of an "unreasonable risk" would be determined by "the
risk in relations to the known benefits of such drug or biological 
product."' 179
The 2006 bill is more explicit in developing specific oversight programs for
newly marketed drugs, although some criticize that the development of such
plans does not elicit sufficient input from patients and providers and that
requirements for post-market surveillance should be expanded to include
off-label studies. 8  This same criticism can be leveled at the FDAA,
because the FDA is limited as to when it can request post-market
surveillance and/or REMS plans since it must first identify a new risk.
Conversely, this may be a viewed as a method of ensuring that the FDA is
not overly paternalistic in its monitoring of drugs and is cautious before
ordering expensive trials and studies.
Ultimately, the passage of the FDAA, which includes new tools for
monitoring drug safety even after a drug has been approved for sale and new
177. S. 3870, 109th Cong. (2006).
178. S. 930, 109th Cong. sec. 2(a), § 507(b)(2) (2005).
179. S. 930, 109th Cong. sec. 2(a), § 507(b)(2) (2005).
180. Building a 21st Century FDA: Proposals to Improve Drug Safety and
Innovation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, & Pensions, 109th
Cong. 27 (2006) (statement of Diane E. Thompson, Vice President for Public Policy and
Communications, Elizabeth Glaser Pediatric AIDS Foundation).
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authority to require label changes, is a step in the right direction for the
FDA. However, the FDAA's cost-benefit analysis remains an issue of
concern as regards pharmacogenomics. With pharmacogenomics on the
horizon, greater emphasis should be focused on providing ready access to
advanced drugs by individual consumers, as opposed to level of access
produced by cost-benefit analysis. Ultimately, it will be necessary for
Congress to re-examine the FDA's mission and to establish more practical
methods for attaining its goals by developing drug safety procedures,
providing more information to the patient and doctor, encouraging off-label
studies, implementing its new post-market surveillance tools in a vigilantly,
and forcing all parties involved to bear the responsibility.
V. RECOMENDATIONS FOR THE SUCCESSFUL ENTRY OF
PHARMACOGENOMICS
A. A System of Contradictory Aims
Disincentives permeate the health and drug industry from drug
approval to marketing and prescribing, the net result being abandonment of
quality and distrust by consumers. Concerns arise as to whether the FDA is
successfully ensuring that only safe drugs reach the market without
unnecessarily keeping effective drugs from those who need them.' 8 1 The
success of drug development does not rely simply on production. Rather, it
is interwoven into the medical profession and its relationship to the law and
governing regulations. Doctors want to reduce the chance of being sued,
which can lead to over-treatment, distrust by the patient, and reluctance to
share information regarding close-calls or questionable results.'
82
Pharmaceutical companies desire profit and are reluctant to expand their
drug research once they have obtained FDA approval because knowledge of
a new side-effect or "adverse event" resulting from the drug may reduce, or
in some cases eliminate, the fruits of their labor in developing the drug.
183
While the FDA's mission is to promote public health, it is not entirely free
from pressure as the desire for new drugs affects decision-making. 184 In the
181. See infra Part 1.
182. See generally Copland, supra note 97; Fontanarosa et al., supra note 7.
183. See Steven Salbu, Off-Label Use, Prescription, and Marketing of FDA-Approved
Drugs: An Assessment of Legislative and Regulatory Policy, 51 FLA. L. REV. 181,206-07
(1999).
184. Copland, supra note 97.
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post-approval timeframe, the FDA's authority is less limited pursuant to the
FDAA; but to request a recall or similar halt of drug marketing may bring
the FDA's credibility into question.1 85 The FDA cannot allow its safety
authority to be hindered by bureaucracy in determining the existence of new
safety information or for fear that the approval process will seem flawed by
such new information.
The FDA's preemption claims may be based in part on its fear that
expensive lawsuits will deter further development of drugs.'
86 The Center
for Drug Evaluation and Research's emphasis on drug development, rather
than surveillance, is blamed in part on the user fees set aside for improving
approval times, but the past failings in post-surveillance may also be
attributed to the lack of authority and recourse that the FDA has once a drug
is approved. 187 The mission of the FDA places the agency in an extremely
difficult position, as no drugs are 100% safe. Thus, the agency must choose
which goal is more important, those that encourage the advancement of drug
development and availability, or perhaps the more conservative goals of
ensuring that only the safest drugs reach the market. Some respond that the
FDA should focus its energies during the approval -process for patient-
specific therapies on the relative safety of a drug rather than proving its
efficacy. 188 Others argue that the FDA standard for drug approval should be
legislatively modified to require not only that new drugs are effective but
that they are distinct and better than already existing drugs for the same
condition.
189
In the context of pharmacogenomics, this dilemma must be
approached differently. Labeling, efficacy, accessibility, and safety issues
that complicate the FDA approval process will be further complicated when,
185. See Fontanarosa et al., supra note 7.
186. Catherine Struve, The FDA and the Tort System: Postmarketing Surveillance,
Compensation, and the Role of Litigation, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y LAW & ETHICS 587,
588 (2005).
187. Reauthorization of the Prescription Drug User Fee Act: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 107th Cong. 28 (2002).
188. Oldham, supra note 6.
189. See generally MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT DRUG COMPANIES: How
THEY DECEIVE US AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT (2004) (arguing that there should be price
controls in the pharmaceutical industry and that the FDA should revise its rules to require
that all new drugs are tested against older patented drugs and only those that are unique
and improved should be approved).
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for example, pharmacogenomic studies reveal that certain drugs will treat
certain genotypes successfully but may not provide any benefit or may have
a negative effect on other genotypes. The burden of obtaining FDA
approval in addition to the possibility of a lack of economic incentive could
be lethal to the development of some pharmacogenomic drugs.
19
0
Consequently, incentives are necessary to encourage pharmacogenomic
research, reporting, and development by drug companies.
One plausible incentive for pharmacogenomic development is
through tax credits and research grants similar to those provided by the
ODA. In the context of pharmacogenomics, the FDA has stressed its desire
to work with researchers and pharmaceutical companies to make these
products available. 191 Grants may provide a powerful incentive to encourage
contribution in the form of Voluntary Genomic Data Submissions. The
increase in submissions will result in an increased understanding by the FDA
at earlier stages, thus potentially speeding future approval processes.
However, attention must also be focused on ensuring that the benefits of
pharmacogenomics are experienced by all genotypes.192 Lawmakers must
be wary of market-driven discrimination. A plan to identify such
discrimination and to deter it by withholding incentives is necessary.93
Already the FDA mandates that all drug manufacturers disclose
effectiveness and safety data based on a variety of subgroups including race,
sex, and age during the drug development process,' 9 and this information
190. See generally Rothstein & Epps, supra note 75.
191. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
INNOVATION OR STAGNATION: CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY ON THE CRITICAL PATH TO
NEW MEDICAL PRODUCTS, at iv (Mar. 2004), available at http://www.fda.gov.oc/
initiatives/criticalpath/whitepaper.pdf ("The product development problems we are seeing
today can be addressed, in part, through an aggressive, collaborative effort to create a
new generation of performance standards and predictive tools. The new tools will match
and move forward new scientific innovations and will build on knowledge delivered by
recent advances in science, such as bioinformatics, genomics, imaging technologies, and
materials science.").
192. See Rothestein & Epps, supra note 75
193. Id. at 230 ("[l]f consumers must absorb rising pharmaceutical costs,
pharmacogenomics will not introduce new questions so much as it will intensify existing
ones about equitable access to medical care.").
194. See FDA Regulatory Affairs: A Guide for Prescribing Drugs, Medical Devices,
and Biologics, supra note 6.
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should be used not only to study a drug's effects on certain populations but
also to monitor potential discriminatory practices in pharmacogenomic drug
development.
Post-market surveillance must be strengthened for safety reasons and
to restore consumer faith in the FDA, as well as in pharmaceutical
companies.' 95 Recent legislation has strengthened the FDA's authority to
require that pharmaceutical companies follow their products and report their
findings, and the FDA should not be hesitant to use this 
new power.196
Strategies for passing relevant drug information from the pharmaceutical
company and the FDA to the consumers and doctors should be developed.
Granting the FDA preemptive authority is not necessary and may expand
consumer concerns of impropriety by the FDA in its relationship with drug
companies. 197 Rather, tort suits would naturally be curtailed through faster
response times by the FDA and faster dissemination of more detailed
information regarding the most recent studies and findings related to a
particular drug.' 98  Patient awareness initiatives should be conducted in
addition to making available drug trial and study information. Often it
seems that television commercials are one of the few sources of consumer
information about new drugs and studies; the availability of drug trial
information and other relevant studies will allow consumers to make more
informed choices. Not only do consumers deserve to know about drugs that
they take, but consumer knowledge may serve to relieve the practice of over-
prescribing. Access to information should not only prevent unnecessary
195. Fontanarosa et al., supra note 7, at 2649-50.
196. GAO DRUG SAFETY REPORT, supra note 34, at 2.
197. See generally Markel, supra note 5, at 2491 (finding that the FDA has a high
disapproval rating among Americans and must regain their confidence); National
Conference of State Legislatures, FDA Final Rule on Prescription Drug Labeling,
http://www.ncsl.org/statefed/health/fdarule.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2008) (stating that
the preemption provision is contrary to consumer protection goals of the FDA).
198. Karen Barth Menzies, Preemption and the FDA-Politics as Usual, Ass'N OF
TRIAL LAW. OF AM. (Feb. 2006) ("Essentially, the government's argument [supporting
preemption] would create a scenario where manufacturers are encouraged not to act
quickly in the face of evolving information when a serious safety issue is suspected with
a marketed drug. Indeed, manufacturers would be better off to not act at all and simply
wait for the FDA to do something."); see David M. Fritch, Comment, Speak No Evil,
Hear No Evil, Harm the Patient? Why the FDA Needs to Seek More, Rather than Less,
Speech from Drug Manufacturers on Off-label Drug Treatments, 9 J. MED. & L. 315,
320-21 (2005).
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risks for consumers and doctors but reestablish trust at all levels for the
patient.
An effective system of post-market surveillance coupled with
increased authority to penalize non-compliance is beneficial because it frees
up the FDA to move drugs more quickly through the approval process. 199
Such flexibility200 recognizes the value of drug availability while increased
disclosure will serve as a necessary restraint on excessive, uninformed use.
Additionally, this increase in information will allow doctors to make
intelligent decisions regarding off-label prescribing.201  In its testimony
before the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions committee,
Consumers Union recommended that
the FDA develop a program to scientifically study drugs widely used
in off-label settings. We are not advocating a ban on such use. We
are simply asking that some scientific study be brought to this area, so
that the labels on these drugs may be expanded and improved in the
cases where the scientific evidence is supportive.
2
Monitoring off-label prescribing will become increasingly necessary as
pharmacogenomics become a reality and as data from such off-label
monitoring becomes available, it should quickly be made available to
doctors and patients.
B. Conclusion
It is necessary for lawmakers to consider current critiques of the
FDA and to develop legislation to curb problems with post-marketing
surveillance and drug approval. However, such considerations should be
made with an eye to encouraging the development of innovative therapies
like pharmacogenomics while anticipating their entry into the drug market.
Monetary incentives may be necessary, but additional incentives are realized
in efforts to reduce the risk of excess tort suits while maintaining a
satisfactory approval pace. Preemption is an unnecessary and extreme
199. GAO DRUG SAFETY REPORT, supra note 34, at 5-6.
200. Hearings, supra note 180, at 25 (statement of Diane E. Thompson, Vice
President for Public Policy and Communications, Elizabeth Glaser Pediatric AIDS
Foundation) (suggesting that legislation giving the FDA more authority in post-marketing
surveillance creates necessary "flexibility" for the Agency).
201. See generally Oates, supra note 56, at 1274, 1281.
202. Hearings, supra note 180, at 46 (statement of Jim Guest, President, Consumers
Union).
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method to ensure drug development and availability at the cost of consumer
distrust. A better method includes continued studies, increased
communication at all levels, and industry incentives. The first critical step
to realizing these goals has been realized by giving the FDA more authority
to advance post-market studies of drugs and to respond in various manners
203
to issues that may arise after approval. While this may result in the
FDA's ability to act more confidently when approving drugs, it is also
necessary to re-establish consumer trust through more access to information.
Pharmacogenomics has the potential to revolutionize medicine through
individualized treatment plans, but in order to benefit from these drugs, it
will be necessary for the legislature to rethink the structure and authority of
the FDA and the meaning of its ambitions. In doing so the opportunity for a
new and improved relationship between drug companies, the FDA, and
consumers exists.
203. GAO DRUG SAFETY REPORT, supra note 34, at 5-6.
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